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Poverty, Heterogeneous Elite, and Allocation of Public 
Spending: Panel Evidence from the Indian States 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Differences in the ideology and support-base of politicians elected in a well-functioning 
democracy are a possible mechanism through which a country’s social and institutional 
structure could influence the allocation of public spending. This is because it is difficult 
for a democratically elected government to be unresponsive to the needs of their 
electorate, especially when the latter are well-informed and politically aware. However, 
even in such democracies, certain elite groups could influence key aspects of decision-
making. In this paper, we explore how in the world’s largest democracy, India, the 
presence of different elite groups – the dominant landed/capitalist elite and the minority 
elite1 – could affect the nature and extent of public spending in general, and on education, 
in particular. We argue that although spending on primary education – like spending on 
public health or nutrition programmes – benefits the poor, investment in education is 
different from most other forms of public spending in that it involves empowerment of 
the general population through the acquiring of knowledge and human capital, which 
could be at variance with the interests of the elite with vested interests. We use state-level 
panel data for the period 1960-2002 to examine this issue, which has thus far remained 
rather unexplored. 
There is now a growing political economy literature on factors governing the 
provision of public goods and services in India. Some of this literature highlights the 
importance of characteristics of the local councillors in the allocation of local public 
spending in a way that favours the social classes they represent. For example, 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) highlight the role of female council leaders in the 
allocation of drinking water in the community, while Bardhan et al. (2008) find that the 
village councils with a leader from the scheduled castes (SC) or scheduled tribes (ST) 
                                                 
1 While the dominant elite could constitute the landed or capitalist elite, the minority elite in our analysis 
refers to elected representatives of the marginalised people, namely,  women and the low caste population, 
who have some legislative power by virtue of being elected as members of the Assembly (see further 
discussion in section 2). 
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tend to receive more credit from the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP). 2 
This is in line with Pande (2003) who found that increasing SC/ST reservation at the state 
assembly is associated with significantly higher transfers to the SC/ST population, 
leading to higher total developmental spending. Besley et al. (2004) find that for high 
spillover public goods (such as the access road to a village), the residential proximity to 
the head of the Gram Panchayat matters, while for low spillover goods, what matters is 
the underlying preference of the head. In contrast, Foster and Rosenzweig (2001)  
highlight the differential preferences between the landed and the landless in the decision 
making process: while landowners would typically favour expenditure on irrigation, there 
would be a shift towards (labour-intensive) road construction projects as the landless 
participate more in decision-making. In an attempt to investigate the role of the 
heterogeneous elite on public spending in the Indian states, we integrate this literature by 
including landed, capitalist as well as minority elite with a view to examining their 
attitude towards the marginalized poor. 
Second, an important focus of our analysis is to explore the effects of the 
heterogeneous elite on public spending on education in the Indian states, which is not the 
central theme in the existing literature on various local public goods that highlight a 
community’s access to drinking water, village roads, IRDP credit or SC/ST employment. 
This is partly because education is under the purview of both central and state 
governments in India, though the latter assume much more responsibility towards 
education.3 Both researchers and policy-makers agree that increasing the stock of human 
capital is essential to boost the rate of growth of any economy; in contrast, low education 
has long-term implications for poverty, reduction of which remains an avowed objective 
of the government of India for much of the post-independence period (see De and Endow 
(2008) for details of the national education policies undertaken in India). 
India is an important case in point where inter- and intra-state disparities in 
literacy rates are striking. Gender inequity continues to remain a serious problem in all 
the states, though it is far worse in the worse-performing ones; the gender gap is only 
                                                 
2 But this need not necessarily be the case. For instance, Bardhan et al. (2005) found that presence of a 
Pradhan (leader) from a minority community may still be associated with negative effects on expenditure 
on employment-generating programmes. 
3 The share of state to total government expenditures in India for our sample period is typically above 50% 
(e.g., see Rao and Singh (2001). 
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about 7% in Kerala while it is more than four times (30%) in Rajasthan and Bihar. The 
situation is even worse among the SC/ST population and especially their women. While 
females constitute about 48% of the Indian population of more than a billion in 2001, 
about 24% belong to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes category. Thus, the 
question remains as to why the marginalised groups of women and low-caste people in 
the Indian states may not obtain the full attention of their politicians in a democracy even 
when they have the numerical strength. Among the existing studies, Pande (2003) found 
that reservation of ST has a significant negative impact on education spending in Indian 
states, while the effect of  reservation of SC is insignificant, (see her Table 6, though this 
result was not highlighted in the paper).4 This is a rather unexpected result and remains to 
be explained. We argue that this perverse result could be explained by the presence of 
heterogeneous elite with conflicting interests, even after controlling for all other factors 
including ethnic heterogeneity. Although our central focus is to explore the role of 
heterogeneous elite on public spending on education, we also examine if similar results 
hold for the case of total public spending on development (of which education is a part), 
and also for non-developmental expenditure (see further discussion below). 
Our analysis crucially rests on a classification of the state population into 
heterogeneous groups including the dominant landed and capitalist elite, the minority 
elite (elected women and low caste representatives in the local assembly) and the 
marginalized poor. The underlying theme is that within a democratic set-up, 
heterogeneous elite groups compete with each other for a fair share of the state surplus 
subject to the underlying poverty rate, reduction of which remains an important objective 
of successive Indian governments during much of the study period. We argue that the 
limited and/or perverse impact of the minority elite to influence public policy in Pande 
(2003) could be better explained by taking account of the  dominant (landed and 
capitalist) elite as well - one cannot exclude the possibility that the dominant elite may 
still dominate the public policy decisions, even in the world’s largest democracy.5 None 
                                                 
4 Chin and Prakash (2009) extend Pande (2003) to examine the effects of political reservation on state 
poverty rates in the Indian states for the period 1960-92 and find that increasing share of ST seats 
significantly lowers poverty, though the effect of SC seat reservation remains insignificant. 
5 It should, however, be noted here that our measure of the minority elite is the proportion of SC, ST and 
women legislators in the ruling party (as shares of total seats won by that party), rather than the percentage 
of seats reserved for SC, ST in the Assembly, as in Pande (2003). But given that our definition of the 
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of the existing empirical studies that we are aware of have, however, explicitly accounted 
for the influence of the dominant landed and capitalist elite while assessing the role of the 
minority elite on public spending on education. It is, however, an open empirical question 
as to whether and how the presence of the dominant (landed and capitalist) and the 
minority elite could promote the interests of the poor in the allocation of public spending 
on education, developmental and non-developmental accounts.  
Why may heterogeneous elite affect public spending differently? The dominance 
of such elite that do not support the investment in human capital in the masses is a theme 
in several recent papers (e.g., Bourguignon and Verdier, (2000)). The argument is that the 
oligarchy will oppose widespread education because educated people are more likely to 
demand political power, thus undermining the dominance of the elite. The result could be 
lower public spending on mass education, and hence the persistence of illiteracy. It is also 
important to make a distinction between the landed and the capitalist elite. As Galor and 
Moav (2006) argued, the productive cooperation between capitalists and workers was 
instrumental in the provision of public education for the masses. Since firms have limited 
incentive to invest in the general human capital of their workers, the level of education 
would be sub-optimal in the presence of credit market imperfections unless it is financed 
publicly. Thus the capitalist (unlike the landed) elite could favour the tax-funded public 
provision of human capital. Thus set against the null hypothesis that the landed or the 
capitalist elite do not promote public spending on mass education, we posit that the 
presence of landed elite could lower education spending while that of the capitalist elite 
would promote it. We also examine the responses of the landed and capitalist elite 
towards the underlying poverty, as poverty alleviation has remained an important 
objective of successive Indian governments as is highlighted in the ‘Garibi Hatao’ 
programme launched in the mid 1970s.  
The minority elite, by contrast, are likely to originate from the poorer section of 
the population. In particular, women and low caste representatives have lower incomes 
and are over-represented in Indian poverty estimates, and it is, therefore, expected that 
they would benefit more from the redistributive public spending (including education 
                                                                                                                                                 
minority elite comprises of a large number of SC, ST candidates elected from reserved seats, the distinction 
with Pande’s classification is rather small in practice. 
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spending), and hence may want to lobby for such spending (Lott and Kenny (1999)). In 
other words, set against the null hypothesis that the minority elite do not influence 
education spending, the alternative hypothesis is that they would favour any redistributive 
spending to help their social classes, which is also in line with the poverty reduction 
objective. We also examine the joint significance of these hypotheses pertaining to 
different elite groups in question, and we do so with a view to exploring the possibility of 
a relationship between different elite groups in question. 
In addition to the determination of the share of education spending, we examine 
the influence of the elite groups on total development spending (as a share of state 
domestic product). This is because total development spending comprises not only of 
spending on education, but also that on health, family and community welfare. While 
some elite may dislike investing in mass education, they may not have the same sort of 
reservations about other components of total development spending, so that their joint 
influence on total development spending may differ from that on education spending as 
such; we empirically explore whether this is, indeed, the case in our sample.  
Finally, we consider whether the presence of heterogeneous elite groups may 
exert any influence on changes in non-developmental spending in the sample states. The 
underlying argument is that the political influence of the dominant (landed and/or 
capitalist) elite may give rise to an emergence and persistence of inefficient political 
regimes even in a democracy that may connive with the minority elite to reduce the 
amount of redistributive public spending, thus resulting in higher non-development 
spending (e.g., see Acemoglu et al. (2007)).  The latter justifies our interest to examine if 
different types of elite (vis-à-vis the poor) may indulge in higher public spending on non-
developmental items in the states (also see Sachs et al. (2000)).  
Given that this is an empirical exploration, in the absence of any prior, we allow 
the data to choose if any of the above hypotheses are valid in our sample. Our analysis is 
based on state-level data for the period 1960-2002 from 16 major Indian states generated 
from various existing and official sources (see section 2). An important part of our 
exercise is the identification of the elite – we devise various measures and check the 
robustness of these measures using both parametric and non-parametric techniques. The 
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data points are the election years.6 The idea is that elected politicians will want to attain 
their targets by the time of the next election when the electorate decides whether to re-
elect them. This justifies use of a first-difference regression equation determining 
changes in public spending (on different accounts) in terms of a number of explanatory 
variables which are lagged by 4-6 years (i.e., one election period). The advantage of 
using a first difference model is that it allows us to minimize the extent of potential 
reverse causality and the resulting endogeneity bias, if any.  
Our central results are robust to additional controls and model specifications (see 
further discussion in section 3), and highlight the differential impact of different groups 
of elite in our sample, which also varies among different accounts of public spending that 
we consider. While a higher proportion of capitalist elite (by itself) does not have a 
significant impact on education spending, we do find fairly strong evidence of the 
capitalist elite boosting educational spending as a response to higher poverty. In contrast, 
a higher proportion of land held by the top 5% does not have a significant impact on 
changes in education spending; and there is no evidence of it rising when we consider the 
response of the landed elite to higher poverty. Once we control for the presence of the 
dominant landed/capitalist elite, the effect of the minority elite as regards public spending 
on education in our sample tends to be insignificant across specifications. If, however, we 
consider the changes in developmental spending, a greater share of land held by the top 
5% of the population significantly increases developmental spending though the landed 
elite tends to be unresponsive to the presence of higher poverty rates per se (the 
interaction term being insignificant in all specifications). As with education spending, the 
capitalist elite, however, continue to exert a positive influence on developmental 
spending as a response to higher poverty. Presence of both landed and capitalist elite tend 
to be associated with significantly higher non-developmental spending . This confirms 
that the real difference in the pattern of spending of the two types of elite is encapsulated 
in regard to educational spending, thus lending some support to Galor and Moav (2006).  
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 describes the data and characterises 
the different categories of elite in India; section 3 develops the empirical model, reports 
the results and explains these in the light of the hypotheses on elite dominance; and 
                                                 
6 As mentioned later, we also ran some regressions using annual data as a robustness check. 
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section 4 concludes. 
 
2. DATA DESCRIPTION 
Our analysis focuses on the 1960-2002 period (see Appendix for data sources for 
different regression variables). The data-set used in the paper is generated by using state-
level economic and political variables available from the World Bank (Ozler, Dutt and 
Ravallion (1996), Besley and Burgess (2000) and Butler, Lahiri and Roy (1996)) for the 
period 1960-1994. We then update this data for the period 1995-2002 using information 
available from the Reserve Bank of India, National Sample Survey (NSS 50th and 55th 
rounds), Election Commission of India and also state-level information on the party of 
their successive Chief Ministers.  
A state-level analysis is appropriate here, as the Indian states have considerable 
decision-making powers for most social sectors including education, health, community 
and social services. We choose the data points to be the election years because it takes 
time for different groups of elite to affect changes in public spending on various 
accounts.7 The idea behind this is that elected politicians will want to attain their targets 
by the time of the next election when the electorate decides whether to re-elect them. In 
most cases elections take place every five years, though there can be an election before 
the next scheduled one if the government in power collapses. There can be problems in 
the estimates if, for example, policies implemented in year four take a further two years 
to complete, so that the model will assign the effect to the next election cycle (also see 
econometric issues to be dealt with because of the unbalanced nature of the data). While 
we need to be cautious in interpreting these results, one election cycle lag appears to be 
the best available option.  
We consider total public spending on education (as a share of state domestic 
product) as the relevant measure of pro-poor spending on education. Education is in the 
concurrent list in the Indian constitution, and includes spending on primary, secondary 
and tertiary education. Clearly, primary and secondary education benefit the poor, and 
spending on these to achieve high levels of literacy is in line with the Millennium 
                                                 
7 Although in our main set of regressions, our data points are the election years, as a robustness check we 
also make use of the annual data on each variable for the period 1960-2002, in some regressions (see Table 
7).   
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Development Goals. The data on educational spending in India shows that an 
overwhelming proportion of spending is on primary and secondary education taken 
together. For example, for the period 1960-1990, for which we have some information on 
expenditure on primary, middle and secondary schooling in the Indian states, the 
proportion of total expenditure on school education (including primary, middle and 
secondary schooling) turns out to be 0.77 with a standard deviation of 0.17. It ought to be 
noted also that as regards the tertiary sector, most universities and nearly all research 
institutions are publicly funded and hence do not charge a regular tuition fee; students 
may, however, need to pay nominal fees towards registration, examination and building 
maintenance, thus making it affordable even to students from poorer backgrounds. It is 
also worth noting that successive policies related to educational financing in India have 
actively encouraged pro-poor spending; For instance, the Kothari Commission (1964-66) 
and the National Education Policy (NEP) of 1968 recommended that public expenditure 
on education should be increased to 6% of GNP by 1986/as early as possible. The NEP of 
1986 and 1992 highlighted the importance of providing resource support towards the 
reduction of disparities, universalisation of elementary education, adult literacy, etc. The 
73rd and 74th constitutional amendments in 1992 involved statutory recognition of local 
government, and inclusion of school education in the list of its priorities. The Saikia 
Committee of 1996 recommended 50% of expenditure on education earmarked for 
primary education, and the 86th constitutional amendment in 2002 recommended the 
provision of free and compulsory education of children between the ages of 6 and 14 
years. All these point to the fact that higher spending on education translates to spending 
that largely benefits the poor (although some members of the elite can also choose to 
avail of this opportunity). 
Likewise, total development and non-development spending too are included as 
shares of state domestic product. State development expenditure includes spending  on 
economic and social services by state governments. The economic services include 
agriculture and allied activities, rural development, special area programmes, irrigation and 
flood control, energy, industry and minerals, transport and communications, science, 
technology and environment.  The social services include education, medical and public 
health, family welfare, water supply and sanitation, housing, urban development, labour 
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and labour welfare, social security and welfare, nutrition, relief on account of natural 
calamities. In contrast, non-development expenditure refers to wages and salaries of public 
servants, interest payments and also payments on pensions and miscellaneous general 
services 
 
2.1. The Dominant Elite  
India is an interesting case in point where the social, economic and political dominance of 
the elite (landed/capitalist/both) is closely interlinked not only with the distribution of 
land and non-land resources but also with the age-old institution of religion, caste and 
gender. Without any loss of generality, we define the dominant elite to be the rich with 
more land or capital or both, who are at the top end of the income distribution. In our 
attempt to understand the potential roles of heterogeneous elite on public spending, we 
need to classify each elite group carefully, which is explained below. 
 
2.1.1. Landed elite 
Land is both the main productive asset and the basis of survival of the majority of the 
population in India still today, especially in rural areas. Thus land tenure is the foundation 
of social structure and political power. One could form some idea of economic 
dominance of the elite, especially in the rural areas, from the distribution of land in these 
states. Table 1 shows the average percentage of total land area held by the top 5% and the 
bottom 40% of the population, and also the Gini coefficient in the distribution of land 
(LANDGINI) over 1960-2002. Since there is very little variation in the Gini index of land 
distribution, we use land held by the top 5% of the population (TOP5) as an index of 
economic dominance of the landed elite; in particular, a greater share of land held by the 
top 5% of the population will imply greater dominance of the landed elite.8  
 
2.1.2. Capitalist elite 
One needs to distinguish the capitalist elite from the landed elite, especially in the context 
of industrial development that gathered pace in India since the late 1970s. Firm 
                                                 
8 We also used the percentage of land held by the bottom 40% of the population in our empirical analysis, 
but it never turned out to be significant. That is why these results are not reported. 
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ownership in developing countries is not only more concentrated than in the West, but 
often concentrated within family holdings. India has been no exception where leading 
families (e.g., Tata, starting in the 1900s) typically own controlling shares, either directly 
or through cross-holdings of firms belonging to the same business group (BGs).9 Private 
sector companies associated with business groups had significantly higher concentrated 
family ownership and substantial assets (Khanna and Palepu (2004)).  
It is, however, not possible to obtain the state-level information on predominance 
of business groups over 1960-2002, primarily because publicly-traded listed firms were 
not required to disclose their identity until very recently. Also the same business group 
can operate in many states and hence it is not possible to trace them to a particular state. 
Consequently, the measure used to identify the presence of the capitalist elite in our study 
relates to the share of registered (as opposed to unregistered) manufacturing output in net 
state domestic product as firms in the registered manufacturing sector10 are typically 
larger than those unregistered and a significant proportion of them are publicly listed. The 
idea is that states with a higher share of registered manufacturing output have greater 
capital investment often made by the controlling owners, which indicates a greater 
presence of capitalist elite. This is also supported by the fact that the correlation 
coefficient between factory fixed capital and net state domestic product from registered 
manufacturing turns out to be 0.98 in our sample, and it is also significant at less than the 
1% level.11  
Using the recent 2005 business group information available from the Centre for 
Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE), we have also been able to trace the number of 
listed firms registered to some business groups by state (see Table 1).12 Clearly, the 
predominance of business group membership is most visible in the most industrialized 
                                                 
9 The Tata Group of India, for example, has member firms that operate in the steel, automobile, telecom, 
software, beverages and leisure industries, among others. In some cases, business groups were created to 
help create internal capital markets in environments where capital markets as such were imperfect. In other 
cases, they were responses to regulatory barriers (e.g., the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
in India) that did not allow expansion of operations in one industry, forcing firms to become conglomerates, 
i.e., expanding in other, sometimes unrelated, industries. 
10 This definition corresponds to the definition of a factory in the Factories Act of 1948. All registered 
firms need to register with Industrial Inspectorates in each state and are surveyed on an annual basis by the 
Annual Survey of Industries.  
11 Another possibility would be to consider the share of private to public companies in the state as a 
measure of capitalist elite; official sources, however, do not publish this information.  
12 Unfortunately, this information is not available for the entire study period, 1960-2002. 
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states like Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat as opposed to Assam, Bihar, Orissa, etc. 
Assuming that this could be considered as a proxy for capitalist predominance in the state 
over this period (given that business group affiliation generally does not vary much over 
time), we calculated the correlation between this measure and the share of registered 
manufacturing in our sample; the correlation turns out to be 0.74 and is also highly 
statistically significant at less than the 1% level. Accordingly, in the absence of a better 
indicator, we accept that the share of registered manufacturing output in state domestic 
product could be a reasonable proxy for capitalist predominance in the state.  
  
2.2. Minority elite   
Although many other nations are characterized by social inequality, perhaps nowhere else 
in the world has inequality been so elaborately represented as in the Indian institution of 
caste. Castes are ranked, named, endogamous (in-marrying) groups, membership in 
which is achieved by birth. Many castes are traditionally associated with an occupation, 
such as high-ranking Brahmans (priests); middle-ranking farmer and artisan groups, such 
as potters, barbers, and carpenters; and very low-ranking leatherworkers, butchers, 
launderers, and latrine cleaners. The Indian constitution classifies the low caste 
population into scheduled castes (SC) and scheduled tribe (ST) groups. Many SC/ST 
people lack assets and live in conditions of abject poverty and social disadvantage. 
Deshpande (2001) has constructed a composite caste deprivation index (CDI) for India 
that includes landholding, assets, livestock, education, and occupation to argue that caste 
development is consistently worse for the SC and ST.  
There is conflicting evidence about the role of women in India. The constitution 
of modern India guarantees equal rights to men and women. India has been one of the 
first countries in the world to confer voting rights to its women. There is, however, a 
parallel body of evidence that seems to challenge this positive view (Menon-Sen and 
Shivkumar (2001)). While the Indian Constitution of 1950 ensures reservation of 
jurisdictions in favour of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the state 
legislature as well as union Parliament, as yet there has been no reservation for women at 
these levels. It was only the 73rd amendment of the Indian Constitution in 1993 that 
allowed reservation of seats for women in the village council, following which, 
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discussion is now under way about the reservation of seats for women at the state and 
national levels as well. 
Our measures of the minority elite pertain to the proportions of women and 
scheduled caste/tribe legislators as shares of total seats won by the ruling party in the 
state assembly. One can argue that this is a pertinent measure for allocation of public 
spending, as these are the people at the margin who could in principle influence policy 
decisions of the government in favour of their social classes. Inability of the minority 
elite to influence public policy in favour of their social groups, if at all, will highlight 
their lack of voice in the ruling government. The average values of these measures of 
political elite dominance in our sample are summarized in Table 1, which particularly 
highlight the low representation of women in all the sample states over this period.13 
While political reservation of SC/ST in the government represents their population 
shares, in the absence of any political reservation, women’s representation continues to 
be very marginal in the sample states (see Table 1, and further discussion below). Very 
often the minority elite co-opt for the dominant elite (landed/capitalist) in politics and fail 
to be spokespersons for their own social classes.14 Thus the gender/caste gap persists in 
political representation. Note however that non-SC/ST legislators of the ruling 
government however constitute the upper stratum of the society and given the close 
correspondence between caste and wealth distribution in India (a la Deshpande 2001), 
could be regarded as the dominant elite. We however are unable to distinguish this 
elected elite into landed and capitalist as we do not observe their wealth status. 
 
2.3. The marginalised poor 
Setting aside the dominant and the minority elite, there remains the masses of the poor. 
Marginalised groups of women (especially widows) and low caste households groups are 
often over-represented in poverty (Drèze and Srinivasan (1997); Parker and Kozel 
(2007)). We include state-level poverty head count ratio to account for the poor in a 
                                                 
13 As possible alternatives, we also considered proportions of (i) women and scheduled caste/tribe 
legislators in the ruling party as a share of all women and scheduled caste/tribe legislators in the state 
assembly; (ii) proportions of women and scheduled caste/tribe legislators in the ruling party as a share of 
total reserved and unreserved seats respectively. However, the results obtained were rather similar. 
14 A number of factors continue to constrain minority participation at all levels of administration including 
their lack of political experience and public skills, threat of violence, motion of no-confidence often 
brought by male/upper caste members. Also see Weiner (2001). 
13 
 
 
state.15 
Poverty remains an endemic problem in India, which is linked to economic, social 
and cultural factors that interact to maintain long-term structural disparities in the 
distribution of resources and social opportunities. The poor are found to be a highly 
heterogeneous group: they have limited physical assets (e.g., land), low education and 
often suffer from health problems. They are also deprived of formal/informal system of 
support and social capital (Parker and Kozel (2007)). Despite their numerical strength, 
the voices of the poor are not generally heard through the ballot box as their average 
turnout in all elections tend to be much lower than the general population.  
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Our analysis is developed in three steps. Section 3.1 explains the methodology, while we 
report and analyse our results in sections 3.2-3.4.  
We start our analysis with some non-parametric Kernel fits. The advantage of the 
non-parametric approach is that it does not specify the functional form; rather it allows 
the data to determine its nature. We consider the bivariate relationship between (a) land 
held by top 5% of the population and changes in education spending, and also that 
between (b) share of manufacturing and changes in education spending for each state, and 
in each case use kernel regression to generate a bivariate kernel fit between each pair of 
variables. These fitted lines are shown in Appendix Figure 1 for selected states over the 
sample period. In general, the relationship tends to be negative for (a) and positive for 
(b). There are some exceptions too: e.g., relationship (a) is much flatter in Haryana and 
Maharashtra than AP and Orissa while some non-monotonicity is observed with respect 
to (b) in most states illustrated. We shall examine the nature of these relationships using 
parametric methods that we explain in section 3.1 below. 
 
3.1. Parametric analysis 
This section explains the parametric empirical models and the associated econometric 
                                                 
15 Following the large household-level evidence in the low-income countries (e.g., see Glewwe and Jacoby 
(2004)), some may also argue that the poor have lower demand for education. Thus, poverty is likely to be 
associated with lower spending on education. 
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issues that we try to address. 
 
3.1.1. Empirical model 
Our objective in this paper is to examine the factors determining the changing share of 
state spending on education, development and non-development account of total state 
spending (as a share of state output). Taking the share of some account of public 
spending in relation to state domestic product allows us to control for a state’s 
wealth/prosperity. Using the election years as data-points, we choose the change in the 
value of the particular component of public spending (as share of state domestic product) 
from the last election to be the dependent variable. This differenced variable allows us to 
examine how the ruling political regime would change the behaviour of the government 
in power (since the last election) while the level variable would simply reflect the 
correlation among measures of different groups of elite and the public spending (on 
different accounts). Using the first difference of the state spending on education also 
allows us to control for the state-specific unobserved heterogeneity and thus to reduce the 
problem of potential endogeneity arising from unobserved heterogeneity (see further 
discussion below). This is in line with much of the cross-country literature analyzing 
economic growth or aspects of fiscal policy (see, for example, Devarajan et al. (1996), 
Gupta et al. (2005)). 
Accordingly, we express the changes in any account of public spending (i.e., 
education, development and non-development) as share of state domestic product, ∆Yit, 
as a function of lagged values of the explanatory variables, Xit-1, where the lag chosen is 
one election period.  
1it it i t itY X         .   (1) 
Here i  are the state-specific fixed effects while t  is the time fixed effect. Use of one 
election-period (i.e., 4-6 years) lagged explanatory variables, including measures of elite 
dominance in the determination of changes in education spending would minimize the 
possibility of endogeneity bias in our analysis (related econometric issues are discussed 
below). We use the fixed effects (accounting for both state and time fixed-effects) panel 
data model to determine the first differences in the public spending on education, 
development and non-development accounts during 1960-2002. As we have quite an 
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unbalanced panel where election years could vary across the states, we cluster all 
standard errors at the state-level (as do Bertrand et al. (2004)), which corrects for any 
correlation in errors within a state; otherwise OLS estimates could be biased.  
  
3.1.2. Explanatory variables  
We use the same set of explanatory variables to determine the effect on the three 
dependent variables of our choice, namely, the changing share of education spending, 
developmental spending and non-developmental spending in state domestic product 
(SDP).  
In order to test our central hypotheses pertaining to the presence of the three 
groups of elite, we first include the measures of landed (TOP5), capitalist (MFG) and 
minority elite measured by the shares of SC/ST (PSCST) and Women (PWOM) members 
of the legislative assembly in the ruling government. Presence of the poor is measured by 
the state-level poverty head count ratio HCR. In addition, we include the interactions 
between TOP5 and HCR (TOP5*HCR) and also that between MFG and HCR 
(MFG*HCR) with a view to explore the responsiveness of the landed and the capitalist 
elite, respectively, to the underlying poverty rates. Note however that we do not include 
any interaction between poverty and the shares of minority elite, namely, PSCST and 
PWOM, as these minority elite themselves belong to the poorer section of the population 
and are therefore assumed to lobby for their own population groups.16  
 Thus, expanding equation (1), we can express the changes in the share of public 
spending on education (ΔPSE)it in SDP in the i-th state in the t-th election year as follows:  
 
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( 5) ( ) ( ) ( 5* )
( * ) ( ) ( ) ( )       (2)
E it E it it it it it
it it it it i t it
PS PS TOP MFG HCR TOP HCR
MFG HCR PWOM PSCST ETHHETY
    
      
    
   
      
       
 
Among other control variables, PSE is the initial value of public spending on 
education while ETHHETY denotes the index of ethnic heterogeneity. We include the 
initial value of public spending on education to capture convergence, if any, in the level 
of this spending among the states over time, conditional on values of other covariates. A 
                                                 
16 This is further supported by the fact that even when we include these interaction terms, they were never 
significant in any specification. 
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negative (positive) sign on its coefficient would indicate convergence (divergence).  
Ethnic heterogeneity has been identified as a key control variable in some 
previous studies. There is some recent literature that stresses the link between ethnic 
fractionalisation and the poor delivery of public services; the relationship could be 
attributed to taste differences of different sections of the population (Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterly (1999)), unequal distribution of the benefits from public goods (Khwaja (2008)) 
and/or inability to impose social sanctions in ethnically diverse communities (e.g., 
Miguel and Gugerty (2005)), thus leading to failures in collective action. Extending this 
argument to the case of public goods provision in the Indian districts, Banerjee and 
Somanathan (2001) have suggested that more heterogeneous communities tend to be 
politically weaker, and therefore are less likely to be denied the goods they want and 
more likely to get some of the inferior substitutes. We construct a direct composite 
measure of ethnic fractionalisation from the population proportions belonging to various 
ethno-religious groups including upper caste Hindus, scheduled caste, scheduled tribes, 
Muslims, Jains, Buddhists, Christians, Sikhs and others, using 1-∑pi2, where pi is the 
share of the particular population group. It is expected that the coefficient of this variable 
would be negative in the determination of change in education spending. This is because 
a greater degree of heterogeneity would mean that the ruling party caters to a smaller 
segment of the total population with a lower provision of public goods/services (also see 
Table 2).17 We augment this baseline regression in various ways to check the robustness 
of our estimates (see section 3.1.3). 
In view of our discussion in the introductory section, let us consider the possible 
effects of our key variables pertaining to the potential response of heterogeneous elite to 
poverty while determining the changes in public spending on education. Important 
parameters of our interest are θ, ,  and ν so that the null and the alternative hypotheses 
with respect to these four parameters in the determination of changes in education 
                                                 
17 We also tried including an indicator variable measuring if the state government is aligned to the 
government at the centre. INC has remained in power at the centre during most of this period, except 1977-
80 (Janata Party rule), 1989-90 (National Front coalition government). Thus the binary variable takes a 
value 1 if the party in power at the state assembly is also the party in power at the centre and 0 otherwise. 
Alliance with the union could be important in determining both earning and spending patterns of the state 
(e.g., see Khemani, 2003). But the variable was never significant in explaining change in state level 
spending and that is why we exclude it from the final specification. 
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spending are as follows: 
 
H0: θ = 0;   H1: θ < 0;    
H0:  = 0; H1:   > 0;  
H0:  = 0; H1:  > 0;  
H0: ν = 0; H1: ν > 0;      (3) 
 
It, therefore, follows that unlike the landed elite, there is a common ground 
between the capitalist elite and the minority elite at least with respect to education 
spending (a la Galor and Moav (2006)). This is tested by the sign and significance of the 
individual coefficients.  
We also perform the joint test of significance of these coefficients with a view to 
explore if the responses of some elite groups may coincide in this respect:  
H0: θ =  = 0;    H1: θ ≠  ≠ 0 
H0:  = ν = 0;    H1:  ≠ ν ≠ 0 
H0: θ =  = ν = 0;   H1: θ ≠  ≠ ν ≠ 0 
H0:  =  = ν = 0;   H1:  ≠  ≠ ν ≠ 0 
H0: θ =  =  = ν = 0;  H1: θ ≠  ≠  ≠ ν ≠ 0   (4) 
 
Further, we examine the validity of hypotheses (3) and (4) with respect to total 
development spending (as a share of state domestic product) using the same specification 
as in (2). This is because total development spending comprises not only of spending on 
education, but also that on health, family and community welfare. While some elite may 
dislike investing in mass education, they may not have the same sort of reservations about 
other components of total development spending. It is thus interesting to see whether any 
of these hypotheses hold for the allocation of total development spending in the states as 
well. 
Finally, we consider the validity of hypotheses (3) and (4) for determining the 
changes in non-developmental spending in the sample states using the same specification 
as in (2); the latter has been motivated by Sachs et al. (2000) who observe a steady 
increase in non-developmental spending in the Indian states. The underlying argument is 
that the political influence of the dominant elite may give rise to an emergence and 
persistence of inefficient political regimes even in a democracy that may connive with the 
minority elite to reduce the amount of redistributive public spending, thus resulting in 
higher non-development spending (e.g., see Acemoglu et al. (2007)).  
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Section 3.2 focuses on changes in share of education spending, section 3.3 instead 
considers changes in share of development spending while section 3.4 examines the 
changing share of non-developmental spending respectively. We however retain the same 
set of explanatory variables as in equation (2) above to determine changing share of 
development (section 3.2) and non-development spending (section 3.3). Means and 
standard deviations of all regression variables18 are reported in Table 2. 
 
3.1.3. Some econometric considerations 
A possible problem pertains to the treatment of unobserved variables and the resulting 
endogeneity bias. We argue that the (state-specific) fixed effects model, by its very 
nature, allows us to control for any state-specific unobserved factors that may affect the 
relationship. So long as these other (omitted/unobserved) variables are state-specific, our 
estimates would be unbiased. To this end, we include both state and year specific fixed 
effects. One may however raise the question that these state-specific (unobserved) fixed 
effects do not control for the possibility of endogeneity being introduced by unobserved 
time-varying factors that we have not controlled for, especially for measures of the 
dominant/minority elite. In order to test the robustness of our results, we try to include 
possible time-varying factors, e.g., share of rural population or alternative time-varying 
indices of ethnic heterogeneity as reflected in the population shares of female and SC/ST 
population (see further discussion on model specification below). 
One may also need to tackle the issue of reverse causality and the resulting bias, if 
any. In this respect, we argue that the use of explanatory variables which are lagged one 
election-period (i.e., 4-6 years), including measures of elite dominance in the 
determination of changes in education (or other types of) spending, would minimize the 
possibility of reverse causality and the resulting endogeneity bias in our analysis (also see 
Devarajan et al. (1996), p. 322). Thus, in order for reverse causality to hold in our 
analysis, ruling elite of any type need to anticipate future spending between four and six 
                                                 
18 Tables 3, 4 and 5 show the final sets of variables that produce the best results for the determination of the 
changes in education, development and non-development spending. Note that we also experiment with 
other variables, e.g., presence of coalition government, president’s rule or if the party in power at the centre 
is the same as the party in power in the state; however these variables were never significant in any 
specification and hence are dropped from the final specification.  
 
19 
 
 
years in advance, which could be ruled out without much loss of generality. 
In particular, we instrument TOP5 by the net sown area (as a share of total area) 
in the state, MFG by the number of registered factory per unit area in the state, PSCST by 
the population proportion of SC/ST and PWOM by the population proportion of women 
in the state. 
Thus, for each dependent variable, we estimate four specifications of the baseline 
model: specification (1) is the baseline regression where in addition to the measures of 
heterogeneous elite groups, we control for the initial value of the particular spending and 
the measure of ethnic heterogeneity. Specification (2) augments specification (1) by 
including the time varying share of rural population. Specification (3) replaces the 
measure of ethnic heterogeneity by the population shares of SC/ST and women 
population. Specification (4) augments specification (3) by bringing back the measure of 
ethnic heterogeneity. 19 All standard errors are clustered at the state-level. 
 
3.2. Estimates of changes in education spending 
The fixed effects estimates of specifications (1)-(4) are shown in Table 3.20 A positive 
(negative) coefficient estimate would indicate an increase (decrease) in the share of 
education spending associated with an increase in the value of the particular explanatory 
variable in the last election year. F-statistics for the joint test of significance of the 
explanatory variables are significant at less than 1% level in each case, confirming the 
                                                 
19 As an additional check, we also follow a regression-based exogeneity test of the measures of elite 
dominance as suggested by Hausman (1978, 1983). First, we regress each of these potentially endogenous 
variables on a set of explanatory variables Z (a subset of X), where Z replaces the particular potentially 
endogenous variable by its instrument. In particular, we instrument TOP5 by the net sown area (as a share 
of total area), MFG by the number of registered factory per unit area in the state, PSCST by the population 
proportion of SC/ST and PWOM by the population proportion of women in the state. Residuals from these 
first stage regressions are then included as additional explanatory variables to augment specification (4) of 
equation (2). Insignificance of the t-statistics associated with these residuals for each of the potentially 
endogenous variable further confirms the exogeneity of these variables. These results are available upon 
request. 
 
20 Given that the 73rd amendment of the Indian constitution took place in 1993, institutions at all levels 
witnessed some changes in their functions. As responsibility for education became decentralised, district-
level personnel, school headmasters and village education committees acquired many new responsibilities. 
To capture the strength of this effect, we also tried including a dummy representing the post-1993 period in 
our regressions; our central results remain unchanged while the post-1993 dummy turns out to be positive 
and highly significant; these results are available on request.  
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goodness of fit of the models estimated (see footnote 19).  
Our results indicate that the initial level of education spending is negative and 
significant in all specifications; thus there is evidence of convergence in public spending 
on education across the sample states despite the sometimes divergent agenda of the 
ruling political regimes in these states over the sample period. Second, the coefficient 
estimate of ethnic heterogeneity is not significant in any of the specifications, contrary to 
the findings of Banerjee and Somanathan (2007). Third, when population controls are 
introduced as a robustness check, the coefficient on rural to total population is positive in 
specifications (3) and (4), and the coefficient on the ratio of female to total population is 
negative in specifications (3) and (4), though their significance vanishes in the complete 
specification (5). More importantly, the presence of these explanatory variables does not 
affect the signs of the coefficients on our key explanatory variables, which we now turn 
to. 
There is clear evidence that poverty rates have a negative effect on education 
spending, as reflected by the sign of the HCR term, which is robustly significant across 
all the specifications. This could be a reflection of the under-representation of the poor in 
the government, lower accountability of the elected members towards the poor (there is 
often low voter turnout among the poor, who are not politically active), and/or lower 
demand for education among the poor as has been argued in the micro literature (e.g., see 
Glewwe and Jacoby (1994)).  
To start with our main hypotheses, we consider the estimates regarding the impact 
of the different categories of elite, ceteris paribus. First, we focus on the estimates for the 
landed elite, using land held by the top 5% of the population as the relevant explanatory 
variable. A greater share of land held by the top 5% is insignificant in all specifications 
(as reflected by the estimated -coefficient). Second, we infer how the landed elite 
respond to the underlying poverty rate through the interaction term, TOP5*HCR. This, 
too, is always insignificant (as reflected by the -coefficient) in all the columns of Table 
3. Third, in order to capture the impact of the capitalist elite on educational spending, we 
look at the share of registered manufacturing output (the coefficient ). The -coefficient 
is not significant in any of the specifications. Fourth, we look at the interaction term, 
MFG*HCR, which captures how the capitalist elite respond to the underlying poverty 
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rate (as reflected by the -coefficient), one of the aspects we are particularly interested in. 
It is quite interesting to note that while the -coefficient is insignificant by itself, the -
coefficient is always positive and significant.  
To obtain a clearer picture of the marginal (partial) effect of the TOP5 and MFG 
variables on changes in education spending, using estimates of complete specification (5) 
of Table 3, we compute the partial derivative of changes in education spending with 
respect to TOP5 and MFG respectively. These are as follows: 
( ) ( )( ),  and ( ).
( 5) ( )
E EPS PSHCR HCR
TOP MFG
             (5) 
Accordingly, when the poverty head count ratio is held at a particular value (e.g., 
its sample mean value or its third-quartile value), the marginal effect of TOP5 turns out to 
be 0, given that  and  are both insignificant. In contrast, given that the interaction term 
between MFG and HCR is always positive and significant (= 0.00292 in specification 
(5)), holding HCR at its mean value (0.4158), the marginal effect of MFG on changes in 
education spending in this specification turns out to be equal to 0.00292*0.4158 (given 
that  is insignificant), and this equals 0.001214. If, instead, we consider its third-quartile 
value (0.5421), this marginal effect will increase to 0.001583. So, the marginal (partial) 
effect of MFG reveals that as the HCR rises from its mean to its third-quartile value, the 
positive education spending effect of MFG remains and becomes larger, indicating that 
capitalists tend to care about education spending in the presence of higher poverty. Thus, 
the presence of the capitalist elite is associated with higher education spending, 
supporting Galor and Moav (2006).  
In our paper, an overall positive effect of MFG is interpreted as a beneficial effect 
of capitalist elite on public education spending in the state, which can be explained in 
terms of the productive cooperation between capitalists and workers. Given that we have 
an imperfect measure of the capitalist elite, one may wonder if this result is compatible 
with any other alternative interpretation. The question is why an increase in the share of 
registered manufacturing in the state could boost total educational spending in the 
presence of poverty. Without much loss of generality, a higher share of registered 
manufacturing could be taken to be an index of industrialisation in the state. One 
possibility is to argue that any democratic government may increase spending on mass 
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education as a response to greater industrialisation, with a view to boosting economic 
growth. But note that the total effect of HCR is negative at the mean value of TOP5 and 
MFG, as this value is equal to -0.0008+0*0.3401+0.00292*0.0867 = -0.00001892 (see 
equation (2) and Tables 2 and 3). Thus, the poorer states tend to have lower education 
spending, which among other things could reflect a lower demand for education among 
the poor as has been highlighted in some household-level studies (e.g., see Glewwe and 
Jacoby (1994)). Given this negative effect of HCR in our sample, it is unlikely that a 
democratic government would necessarily boost spending on mass education (but they 
may do so on some other account of development spending) in response to greater degree 
of industrialisation, thus weakening the validity of this alternative interpretation. 
The other pertinent issue here is to identify a possible mechanism through which 
landed and capitalist elite could influence decisions on educational spending. Clearly in a 
democratic framework, a possible mechanism in this respect would focus on the link, if 
any, between the elite (landed and capitalist) and the elected legislators in the ruling 
government, who are the decision-makers at the state level. In an attempt to pursue this 
further, we wanted to classify the legislators by their income/wealth. This is because it is 
likely that wealthy legislators would align their interests with the elite. We neither 
observe income/wealth/education of the elected legislators, nor can we identify whether 
the elected legislators represent a rural/urban constituency. We only observe the caste and 
gender of the elected legislators as made available by the Election Commission of India. 
Given that there is a close correspondence between caste and wealth distribution in India 
(e.g., see Deshpande, 2001), it can be inferred that non-SC/ST legislators are more likely 
to be more wealthier than those from SC/ST categories.  
The average share of upper-caste, (i.e., non-SC/ST) legislators in the ruling 
government turns out to be 0.75 for the 1960-2002 sample. Although India is the world’s 
largest democracy and there has been reservation of SC/ST seats in the Assembly since 
1950, there persists an upper-caste domination in the legislature. The latter is further 
highlighted by the fact that Chief Ministers across states and over time have typically 
been from non-SC/ST backgrounds. As such, it is likely that the wealthy upper caste 
legislators would align their interests with the elite, though a priori it is difficult to predict 
if they would align with the landed or the capitalist elite.  
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In an attempt to identify this possible mechanism, we modify equation (2) as 
follows:  
[(PSE)]it = α0(PSE)it +α1PUCit+α2(PUC*TOP5*HCR)it+α3 (PUC*MFGR*HCR) it 
+ α4 (PUC*HCR)it + α5 (ETHHETY) it + uit     (6) 
In equation (6), the proportion of upper caste legislators is denoted by PUC, 
which includes all upper caste legislators, both men and women. We also include some 
interaction terms: the interaction term, PUC*HCR, shows whether the upper caste 
legislators respond to poverty rates while making decisions on education spending,  while 
the interaction terms, PUC*TOP5*HCR and PUC*MFGR*HCR highlight the response 
of the upper caste legislators to the presence of the elite and the underlying poverty rate. 
Thus PUC*TOP5*HCR indicates whether/how government legislators respond to the 
interests of the landed elite and the poor, while PUC*MFGR*HCR indicates how 
government legislators respond to the interests of the capitalist elite and the poor. FE-
OLS estimates for changes in education spending for specification (5) are summarized in 
Appendix Table A1. 
While the upper caste legislator variable in specification (1) of Table A1 refers to 
all upper caste legislators (PUC), that in specification (2) includes only upper caste male 
legislators (PUCM) in the ruling government in our sample. It is evident from the Table 
that states with a higher share of upper caste legislators will experience significantly 
higher education spending only if both poverty rate and  registered manufacturing shares 
(representing the capitalist elite) are high since only PUC*MFG*HCR is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. There is, however, no significant response from upper caste 
legislators towards increased education spending if the poverty rate, or both poverty rate 
and land inequality (representing a higher share of the landed elite in the state), are high. 
Results remain unchanged irrespective of whether women legislators in the ruling 
government are included in the share of upper caste legislators or not, given that the 
coefficient on PUCM*MFG*HCR remains significant. We believe that these results 
further justify the validity of our original results because it highlights the nature of the 
underlying decision-making process.  
After controlling for the presence of the dominant landed/capitalist elite, the share 
of SC/ST or women MLA in the ruling government fails to have any significant impact 
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on changes in education spending. The latter perhaps validates the general wisdom that a 
greater degree of minority representation in the ruling government as such cannot by 
itself induce higher investment in public education (see discussion in section 2.2) in the 
presence of dominant elite.  
While we cannot directly test if the minority elite is aligned with some group of 
the dominant elite, we can indirectly test if the minority elite have any mandate to serve 
their people in our sample. In doing so, we examine if the winning seat in the state 
assembly won by a woman and low caste member is closely correlated with the turnout 
among female and low caste voters. This is because if there is no such correlation, it 
would not conceivably be necessary for these members to cater to their communities. Our 
results (available upon request) do suggest that there is no significant association between 
turnout among low caste voters and the election of low-caste members in the assembly, 
after controlling for state literacy rate and ethnic heterogeneity over the study period.  
Finally, we test the joint significance of the presence of landed, capitalist and 
minority elite coefficients as laid out in equation (4). The resultant Wald statistics as 
summarized in Table 6 highlight that we cannot reject any of the null hypotheses as listed 
in equation (4). In other words, there is no evidence of a coalition between landed and 
capitalist elite, two groups of minority elite, the landed and minority elite, capitalist and 
minority elite or for that matter among all three groups of elite on changes in any 
spending accounts in our sample.  
To conclude, the limited impact of the minority elite on public policy can be 
explained by accounting for the dominant landed and capitalist elite in our framework. 
Our results thus appear to be compatible with Weiner (2001), page 211: “The 
incorporation into the political system of backward caste elites and members of 
Scheduled Castes has apparently done little to reduce the enormous social and economic 
disparities that persist in India’s hierarchical and inegalitarian social order”.  
 
3.3. Changes in Developmental Spending 
Education is only one component of total developmental spending incurred by the Indian 
states. In addition to education, total development spending also includes spending on 
health, family welfare, community building, etc. We would now like to see how much 
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our explanatory variables can account for changes in overall development spending, and 
thereby capture the possible effect of elite dominance on state developmental 
expenditure. The question also remains if the beneficial role of capitalist elite holds even 
when education spending is summed with other accounts of development spending. 
We now include the same set of explanatory variables as in Table 3 to explain 
changes in total developmental spending as a proportion of SDP; these fixed effects 
estimates are shown in Table 4. Some results in Table 4 are similar to those in Table 3, 
notably that the HCR variable is negative and highly significant in all four specifications, 
and the initial level of development spending is negative and strongly significant in all 
specifications. None of the measures representing the minority elite (like SC/ST MLA 
and women MLA) turn out to be significant in determining developmental spending, as 
was the case with educational spending. As with education spending, capitalists seem to 
be responsive to the interests of the poor; the sign of the -coefficient on the 
(MFG*HCR) interaction term is still positive and significant in all four specifications. 
Also, the effects of ethnic diversity are weak, reflected by the coefficient on the 
ETHHETY variable as well as the alternative measures like share of SC/ST and share of 
women in the population.  
An interesting difference between Tables 3 and 4 is that the population controls, 
some of which were significant in a few education spending specifications, now turn out 
to be insignificant for all the development spending specifications. More importantly, two 
results are quite different here and need to be highlighted: unlike for the case of education 
spending, the landed elite clearly tend to favour development spending, and they do so by 
increasing spending on the developmental account. This is reflected by a positive (and 
statistically significant) β-coefficient on the (TOP5) term in all four specifications. 
However, the landed elite do not respond to higher poverty by increasing their 
developmental spending, as reflected by the (TOP5*HCR) interaction term being 
insignificant. The other result is that the coefficient on the share of registered 
manufacturing is negative and significant at the 5% level for developmental spending in 
specifications (1) and (2), but then turn out to be insignificant for specifications (3) and 
(4), (although, as noted in the previous paragraph, the (MFG*HCR) term is positive and 
significant in all specifications). 
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A comparison of the results with respect to the landed and capitalist elite indicates 
that the landed elite are aware of the need to fulfil the basic requirements of the electorate 
to enhance their possibility of re-election, and consequently boost developmental 
expenditure, but do not incur more developmental spending when the poverty rate is 
higher. By contrast, the capitalist elite generally spend less on development but tend to 
spend more only when the rate of poverty is higher. In comparing these results with 
educational spending, it is significant that despite being favourably inclined towards 
overall developmental spending, the rural elite do not have the incentive to spend on mass 
education, although their capitalist counterparts do, and certainly while responding to 
higher poverty.21 In fact, as far as Table 4 is concerned, none of the changes to the 
baseline specification in Column (1) affects the regression results in any significant way.  
 
 3.4. Changes in Non-developmental Spending 
Finally, in view of the findings of Sachs et al. (2000) for India, we shall in this section 
examine the role of the heterogeneous elite on changes in non-developmental spending 
(as a share of state output) in the Indian states in our 1960-2002 sample; these results are 
summarized in Table 5. 
 First, there is evidence of significant convergence among the Indian states as 
states with higher initial non-developmental spending tend to have lower changes in 
spending, thus revealing signs of catching up, as was the case for educational and 
developmental spending. Second, as with the other two categories of spending, higher 
poverty translates into lower non-developmental spending, as is clear from the negative 
and significant sign of the -coefficient. Third, although the presence of the rural elite is 
associated with higher spending on non-developmental items (as was the case with 
development spending), the rural elite do not spend more on such items if the underlying 
poverty rate is higher. In contrast, the presence of capitalist elite is associated with greater 
spending on non-developmental items in the presence of poverty, as is evident from the 
sign of the -coefficient, which shows perhaps an unusual response to the prevalence of 
poverty (despite exerting a beneficial role as regards education and development 
                                                 
21 Recall that in Table 3, the coefficient on (TOP5*HCR) was insignificant, while that on (MFG*HCR) was 
positive in all the specifications. 
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spending). As before, representation of women or low castes fails to have any perceptible 
effect on non-development spending in any specification. The same applies for the 
various population controls, as was the case with developmental expenditure at the state 
level. 
 
3.5. Fixed Effects Estimates of Annual Data 
We finally perform the same exercise as before (i.e., by considering the effects of the 
same explanatory variables on shares of the three types of public spending in turn), but 
using annual data for the entire sample, 1960-2002. This increases the number of 
observations by more than three times compared with the previous exercise, but worsens 
the results for educational and developmental spending significantly. Looking at the 
results of specification (4) – which is the only specification we report – for changes in 
each spending account in Table 7, one can observe that (in addition to the initial levels of 
the respective categories of spending), only the ethnic heterogeneity index turns out to be 
negative and strongly significant in all the regressions. Strikingly, the (β, γ, η) 
coefficients in the educational and developmental spending are insignificant, and the 
same applies for the interaction terms, θ and  as well. The coefficient on initial 
education/developmental spending is now significant, but the positive sign indicates that 
there is no catching up. This exercise demonstrates that it is perhaps better for analytical 
as well as empirical reasons to stick to our original set of results with the data points 
being election years. This is because, as noted earlier, it takes time for a ruling 
government to influence changes in any type of spending considered here.  
 
 
4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper empirically examined the role of heterogeneous elite in determining the 
pattern of public spending, something that remains little discussed in the literature. India 
is an important case in point, where decision-making on public spending could be 
influenced by heterogeneous groups of elite, i.e., the dominant landed and capitalist elite, 
and the minority elite. While the existing literature highlights the effective role of the 
minority elite on certain types of public spending, we argue that the effectiveness of the 
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minority elite in influencing any public policy depends on the presence of dominant 
landed and capitalist elite as well. In particular, we argue that the productive cooperation 
between the capitalist elite and the workers may induce dominant capitalists to favour 
spending on education, while the landed elite tend to oppose investment in basic 
education. This could be because they are fearful of dilution of their political dominance 
by the educated poor. While the minority elite may tend to favour any redistributive 
spending, including education, their effectiveness could be limited by their under-
representation in the government.  
Results using available panel data for the period 1960-2002 from the Indian states 
are robust to alternative specifications, clustering of standard errors as well as Hausman 
test for exogeneity of the potentially endogenous variables. These results suggest that the 
presence of the capitalist elite is associated with higher education spending when the 
underlying poverty rate is high, while the landed elite tend to be unresponsive to the 
underlying poverty rate in the sample states. While the landed elite are never responsive 
to the underlying poverty rate even in the allocation of total development spending, their 
presence per se is associated with higher development spending. Also, the beneficial role 
of capitalist elite in responding to poverty persists even in the allocation of total 
development spending. Presence of both capitalist and landed elite is, however, 
associated with higher non-developmental spending. This exercise confirms that the real 
difference in the pattern of spending of the two types of elite is encapsulated with regard 
to educational spending. After controlling for the presence of the dominant elite, the 
minority elite fails to have any statistically significant impact on any category of public 
spending that we consider. 
Unlike much of the previous literature, our analysis highlights the lack of power-
sharing between different groups of elite. Results of this paper thus emphasize that 
ensuring political representation of the marginalized people (women and low castes) by 
itself may not be sufficient to erode their initial disadvantages. Any efforts to ensure a 
balanced distribution of power would not only necessitate further land reform but also 
establishment of supporting legal and judicial institutions.  
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Table 1. Characterisation of economic elite dominance, 1960-2002 
 Literacy 
rates (%) 
Capitalist elite Landed 
elite 
Minority elite [2] 
% MLAs in govt. 
 
State  
1991 
 
2001 
%Share 
of mfg 
output  
Listed 
firms 
affiliated 
to BG [1] 
%Land 
held by 
Top 5% 
popn 
Women  SC/ST  Poverty 
HCR(%) 
AP 44.10 61.1 5.7 20 (43) 41.4 4.69 21.45 40.61 
Assam 52.90 64.3 7.1 1 (3) 25.6 3.91 22.78 35.35 
Bihar 38.50 47.5 7.4 1 (2) 34.6 4.47 21.97 54.40 
Gujarat 61.30 70.0 16.7 26 (66) 31.7 5.47 31.28 43.40 
Haryana 55.80 68.6 10.6 10 (28) - 6.40 23.20 27.02 
J&K - 54.5 1.8 0 (0) 21.5 1.79 3.74 25.19 
Karnataka 56.00 67.0 9.2 6 (24) 32.8 5.08 20.80 44.05 
Kerala 89.80 90.9 7.1 3 (9) 42.3 2.99 7.50 48.28 
MP 44.20 64.1 5.8 3 (8) 29.7 6.88 45.04 47.80 
Maharastra 64.90 77.3 19.1 94 (258) 33.2 5.11 16.10 48.76 
Orissa 49.10 63.6 5.5 2 (2) 31.3 5.29 44.41 52.32 
Punjab 58.50 69.9 6.4 10 (11) 37.1 5.31 24.08 23.30 
Rajasthan 38.60 61.0 4.7 8 (16) 33.3 6.35 34.75 41.57 
Tamil  
Nadu 
62.70 73.5 13.8 37 (81) 39.6 5.93 23.66 45.87 
UP 41.60 57.4 6.0 11 (22) 29.8 5.81 24.14 44.01 
West 
Bengal 
57.70 69.2 11.2 12 (40) 31.6 4.86 28.79 38.75 
Note: Share of manufacturing in state domestic product is used as a measure of capitalist elite, while % of 
land held by top 5% of the population is a measure of landed elite. States with higher Gini in land 
distribution is also a measure of dominance of landed elite while the composite index of land reform 
legislation is a complement of dominance of landed elite. In particular, states with more land reform 
legislations are likely to have more harmonious class relationships.  
[1] Number in the parentheses indicates the corresponding number of total non-financial listed firms in the 
state. 
[2] Women and SC/ST members in the ruling party as percentage shares of total ruling party seats. 
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Regression Variables 
  
 1960-2002 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. 
Educational expenditure as share of sdp 
(EDUEXPY) 
 
0.018 
 
0.02 
\Development expenditure as share of sdp 
(DEVEXPY) 
 
0.055 
 
0.079 
Non-development spending as share of 
sdp (NDEVEXPY) 
 
0.032 
 
0.042 
Changes in educational spending CHEDU 0.00038 0.015 
Changes in development spending 
CHDEV 
0.00072 0.053 
Changes in non-development spending 
CHNDEV 
 
0.0009 
 
0.029 
Proportion of land held by the top 5% of 
the population (TOP5) 
 
0.3401 
 
0.0564 
Share of registered manufacturing in net 
state domestic product (MFG) 
 
0.0867 
 
0.0504 
Proportion of all SC/ST members in the 
ruling party out of all seats won by the 
ruling government (PSCST) 
 
 
0.2460 
 
 
0.1379 
Proportion of all women in the ruling 
party out of seats won by the ruling 
government (PWOM) 
 
 
0.0503 
 
 
0.0435 
Poverty HCR (HCR) 0.4158 0.1616 
Index of ethnic heterogeneity 
(ETHHETY) 
0.5457 0.1907 
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 Table 3. FE estimates of changes in education spending (CHEDU)  
(1960-2002 election years data) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CHEDU CHEDU CHEDU CHEDU 
Initial education 
spending 
-0.542*** -0.565*** -0.607*** -0.595*** 
 (0.170) (0.170) (0.183) (0.188) 
Land held by 
top5% (TOP5) 
0.000728 0.000884 0.000553 0.000374 
 (0.000419) (0.000577) (0.000546) (0.000464) 
Share of mfg 
regis. (MFG) 
-0.206 -0.185 -0.118 -0.118 
 (0.1674) (0.1716) (0.0831) (0.0800) 
Poverty rate 
(HCR) 
-0.000532** -0.000660** -0.000827*** -0.000795*** 
 (0.000220) (0.000225) (0.000193) (0.000213) 
TOP5* HCR 3.43e-06 1.49e-06 1.84e-07 1.75e-06 
 (4.00e-06) (5.40e-06) (4.98e-06) (4.46e-06) 
MFG*HCR 0.00385** 0.00394* 0.00307* 0.00292* 
 (0.00143) (0.00186) (0.00171) (0.00156) 
SC/ST MLA -0.0158 -0.0144 -0.0111 -0.0119 
 (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0126) (0.0124) 
Women MLA 0.0366 0.0356 0.0378 0.0386 
 (0.0285) (0.0276) (0.0274) (0.0270) 
ETHHETY -0.0121 -0.00596  -0.0100 
 (0.0100) (0.00931)  (0.0110) 
SC/ST Popn   0.128 0.130 
   (0.0823) (0.0800) 
Female Popn.   -0.318* -0.324* 
   (0.173) (0.174) 
Rural Popn  0.138 0.164* 0.152* 
  (0.102) (0.0781) (0.0775) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 131 131 130 130 
R-squared 0.633 0.642 0.674 0.675 
Number of state 16 16 16 16 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. FE estimates of changes in development spending (CHDEV) 
(1960-2002 election years data) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CHDEV CHDEV CHDEV CHDEV 
Initial devt. Spending -0.504*** -0.523*** -0.516*** -0.539*** 
 (0.0493) (0.0512) (0.0815) (0.0576) 
Land held by top5% 
(TOP5) 
0.00676* 0.00720* 0.00581* 0.00697* 
 (0.00357) (0.00376) (0.00344) (0.00377) 
Share of mfg regis. 
(MFG) 
-0.553** -0.442** -0.296 -0.232 
 (0.222) (0.181) (0.196) (0.214) 
Poverty rate (HCR) -0.00287** -0.00343** -0.00322*** -0.00348** 
 (0.00122) (0.00142) (0.00107) (0.00125) 
TOP5* HCR -2.80e-05 -3.53e-05 -2.41e-05 -3.44e-05 
 (3.70e-05) (4.17e-05) (3.26e-05) (4.31e-05) 
MFG * HCR 0.0156* 0.0155* 0.0133* 0.0131* 
 (0.00754) (0.00825) (0.00642) (0.00679) 
SC/ST MLA 0.0617 0.0667 0.0673 0.0731 
 (0.0886) (0.0907) (0.0864) (0.0918) 
Women MLA -0.0401 -0.0408 -0.0436 -0.0462 
 (0.152) (0.145) (0.166) (0.165) 
ETHHETY 0.0494 0.0744  0.0758 
 (0.0751) (0.0844)  (0.0929) 
SC/ST popn   0.235 0.211 
   (0.191) (0.207) 
Female popn   -0.107 -0.0887 
   (0.404) (0.422) 
Rural popn  0.596 0.553 0.651 
  (0.420) (0.328) (0.399) 
     
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 131 131 128 128 
R-squared 0.535 0.548 0.547 0.553 
Number of state 16 16 16 16 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. FE Estimates of changes in non-development spending (CHNDEV) 
(1960-2002 election years data) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CHNDEV CHNDEV CHNDEV CHNDEV 
Initial non-devt. 
Spending 
-0.566*** -0.580*** -0.603*** -0.610*** 
 (0.0896) (0.0866) (0.126) (0.110) 
Land held by top5% 
(TOP5) 
0.00364* 0.00378* 0.00311* 0.00330** 
 (0.00186) (0.00193) (0.00168) (0.00160) 
Share of mfg regis. 
(MFG) 
-0.461** -0.420** -0.295 -0.283 
 (0.177) (0.171) (0.192) (0.183) 
Poverty rate (HCR) -0.00130* -0.00150* -0.00165** -0.00169** 
 (0.000674) (0.000775) (0.000649) (0.000727) 
TOP5*HCR -1.48e-05 -1.73e-05 -1.27e-05 -1.44e-05 
 (1.54e-05) (1.69e-05) (1.39e-05) (1.73e-05) 
MFG*HCR 0.0106** 0.0106** 0.00872* 0.00867* 
 (0.00437) (0.00458) (0.00410) (0.00410) 
SC/ST MLA 0.0215 0.0232 0.0245 0.0255 
 (0.0342) (0.0355) (0.0332) (0.0355) 
Women MLA -0.0511 -0.0516 -0.0471 -0.0479 
 (0.0625) (0.0605) (0.0649) (0.0666) 
ETHHETY 0.00426 0.0130  0.0133 
 (0.0293) (0.0314)  (0.0353) 
SC/ST popn   0.128 0.124 
   (0.136) (0.142) 
Female popn   -0.202 -0.198 
   (0.202) (0.207) 
Rural popn  0.213 0.230 0.247 
  (0.222) (0.175) (0.196) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 131 131 128 128 
R-squared 0.646 0.652 0.659 0.660 
Number of state 16 16 16 16 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Wald statistic for joint test of significance 
  
 Wald F statistic (p-value) 
 CHEDU CHDEV CHNDEV 
TOP5 = MFG 0.91 1.45 1.47 
 (0.42) (0.26) (0.26) 
PSCST = PWOM 0.79 0.32 0.38 
 (0.47) (0.58) (0.69) 
TOP5 = PSCST = PWOM 0.93 
(0.45) 
0.86 
(0.48) 
0.63  
(0.61) 
MFG = PSCST = PWOM 0.75  
(0.54) 
0.87  
(0.48) 
1.04 
(0.40) 
TOP5 = MFG = PSCST = 
PWOM 
0.72  
(0.59) 
0.84  
(0.52) 
0.79 
(0.55) 
 
37 
 
 
Table 7. FE estimates of changes in public spending using annual data 
1960-2002 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CHEDU CHDEV CHNDEV 
Initial Edu. spending 0.0262*   
 (0.0152)   
Initial Dev. spending  0.155***  
  (0.0250)  
Initial Non-dev. Spend   0.211*** 
   (0.0376) 
TOP5 4.50e-06 -1.18e-05 -5.53e-05** 
 (3.23e-06) (1.78e-05) (2.25e-05) 
MFG. 0.000295 0.000145 -3.42e-05 
 (0.000293) (0.00163) (0.00208) 
HCR 1.62e-06 -6.81e-06 -1.92e-05*** 
 (1.01e-06) (5.72e-06) (7.17e-06) 
TOP5*HCR -4.68e-08 1.07e-07 4.75e-07** 
 (2.87e-08) (1.62e-07) (2.04e-07) 
MFG*HCR -1.94e-06 1.01e-05 7.48e-06 
 (3.54e-06) (1.97e-05) (2.51e-05) 
SC/ST MLA 3.17e-05 6.46e-05 3.01e-05 
 (2.31e-05) (0.000129) (0.000163) 
Women MLA -9.60e-05 -0.000394 -0.000412 
 (5.92e-05) (0.000294) (0.000370) 
ETHHETY -2.64e-05*** -0.000202*** -0.000221*** 
 (8.71e-06) (4.97e-05) (5.84e-05) 
Intercept -0.000174 0.000514 0.00203*** 
 (0.000108) (0.000599) (0.000753) 
Observations 412 420 419 
R-squared 0.050 0.099 0.100 
Number of state 15 15 15 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1. Non-parametric Kernel Fit of TOP5 and MFG for Selected States 
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Appendix: Data Preparation 
 
Variable Source 
(1) Education spending as share of state 
domestic product 
Ozler, Dutt and Ravallion, 1996; RBI 
website 
(2) Net state domestic product from 
registered manufacturing (as share of total 
net state domestic product) 
Besley and Burgess 2000; RBI website 
(3) Poverty head count ratio Ozler, Dutta and Ravallion, 1996; NSS 93-
94, 99-00 
(4) Share of Hindu, SC, ST, Muslim, 
Christians, Jains, Buddhists,  Sikhs in total 
population; we use this population 
proportion (si) to calculate ethnic 
heterogeneity as 1- ∑(si)2 
Besley and Burgess, 2000, Census 2001 
(5) Land held by top 5% of the population Besley and Burgess, 2000, own calculation 
using NSS data 93-94 and 99-00 
(6) Party of the Chief Minister Besley and Burgess, 2000, own calculation 
using Election Commission of India 
website 
(7) Winning SC/ST and woman 
candidate(s) in each state 
Butler, Lahiri and Roy, 1996; own 
calculation using Election Commission of 
India website 
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Appendix Table A1. Identifying a possible democratic mechanism:   
FE-OLS estimates of changes in education spending in Indian states 1960-2002 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES CHEDU CHEDU 
   
Upper caste legislators 0.0176 0.0231 
 (0.0162) (0.0159) 
Upper caste*HCR -0.00103 -0.00106 
 (0.000784) (0.000780) 
Upper 
caste*TOP5*HCR 
7.35e-06 7.30e-06 
 (1.74e-05) (1.69e-05) 
Upper caste* 
MFG*HCR 
0.00328** 0.00318** 
 (0.00129) (0.00123) 
Observations 133 133 
R-squared 0.418 0.421 
Number of state 16 16 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Other 
regression variables include initial education spending (as a share of SDP), index of 
ethnic heterogeneity and an intercept. Specification (1) uses all upper caste (male and 
female) legislators while specification (2) uses only upper caste male legislators in the 
ruling government in our sample.  
 
 
 
 
